Hm... maybe it is the same. The difference I'm thinking of is the fact that color is both definitive and persistent. Neither of these qualities apply to an ordinary pitch-object association; pitch is defined by the energy of an action, not a state of being, and by its physical nature does not persist.
Now that you mention it, there is a Pinocchio coloring book in the children's waiting area at the psychology building, and I noticed last week that some immature hand had scribbled all the "wrong" colors onto the puppet's image.
But no... you say, rhetorically, what I suspect to be the critical issue: "How do I know it's red? Because it's a fire engine." That is, if you look at something which you know, conceptually, to be a fire engine, then you know you must be looking at "red". You have confirmation without any knowledge of or comparison to any other colors... because a "fire engine" is a unique concept which is not itself a color, but which produces only red.
The world is full of objects which are definitively colored. Sometimes the concept is its objective existence (fire truck, grass, strawberries); sometimes the concept is its functional nature (a stoplight may be red, yellow, or green); but in every case, the color may be seen, perceived, and correctly recognized by the object-concept alone, without any explicit knowledge of or reference to abstract color-concepts.
I can think of no such object for pitch. I'm not aware of any object on the planet that has a universally definitive pitch. Usually, when I can think of an object produces a consistent pitch, that pitch has been arbitrarily selected, or at the very least is unique to a specific action of that single instance of that particular object.
So I will reiterate what I imagine may be the key mechanism, replacing the critical word: a [pitch] may be seen, perceived, and correctly recognized by an object-concept alone, without any explicit knowledge of or reference to abstract pitch-concepts.
My expectation is the possibility that, by using pitch to accomplish particular tasks, we may stop thinking of it as a pitch-concept and instead integrate its physical production with some other concept. When I produce the word "bubble" I am not thinking about the production of letters and phonemes, but I produce them all the same. I know I have succeeded not by reflecting on and analyzing the individual sounds I have created, nor by my listener telling me "that was correctly spoken." I know because the other person receives the idea of a bubble.